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Note 
 
Solving the Problem of Problem-Solving Justice: 
Rebalancing Federal Court Investment in 
Reentry and Pretrial Diversion Programs 
By Devin T. Driscoll∗ 
Rosemary has just been arrested near the campus of the 
University of Oregon, in Eugene.1 Eugene Police Department of-
ficers, while conducting a routine traffic stop, discovered twenty-
seven grams of powder cocaine on her person. Rosemary, a soph-
omore at the University, has never been arrested before. While 
this volume of cocaine is not enough to bump her into mandatory 
minimum territory,2 which would require a judge to impose a 
particular sentence, federal prosecution still carries a possible 
 
∗  J.D. Candidate 2018, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 2008, 
Providence College; M.P.P. 2011, University of Minnesota Hubert H. Humphrey 
School of Public Affairs. This Note would not exist without several incredible 
members of the federal and state bench: thank you to Judge Ann Aiken for in-
spiring me to learn more about criminal reentry through her innovation and 
service to the people of Oregon; to Judge Jack B. Weinstein for providing me 
with invaluable information about the antirecidivism work of the Eastern Dis-
trict of New York; to Judges Donovan Frank and Susan Richard Nelson for al-
lowing me to observe their reentry court programs in the District of Minnesota; 
and to Judge Mark J. Kappelhoff for his encouragement and counsel during my 
early development of this project. Thank you to the talented editors and staff of 
Minnesota Law Review for your tireless efforts as Guardians of the Profession, 
and also for your friendship. I am particularly grateful to Frank Guenthner, 
Taylor Mayhall, Caitlin Opperman, Emily Atmore, and Mitchell Ness for their 
assistance in making this Note worthy of inclusion in Volume 102. Finally, 
thank you to Katie Driscoll for your unwavering support, your wisdom, and your 
compassion. I love you. Copyright © 2018 by Devin T. Driscoll. 
 1. This fictionalized account offers a perspective of the critical impact 
prosecution under the state-based ex-ante approach can have, versus prosecu-
tion under the federal ex-post approach. 
 2. See, e.g., Families Against Mandatory Minimums, Federal Mandatory 
Minimums, FAMM.ORG, http://www.famm.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/ 
Chart-All-Fed-MMs-NW.pdf (last visited Jan. 30, 2018) (listing five kilograms 
of cocaine as the amount necessary to trigger a mandatory minimum prison 
sentence under federal law).  
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sentence of up to twenty years in prison.3 If, however, Rosemary 
is charged by the Lane County District Attorney for the Class C 
felony of unlawful possession of cocaine,4 she could face up to five 
years of incarceration.5 This disparity in sentences is not the 
only significant difference in potential outcome based on 
whether she is charged by federal or state authorities. Rose-
mary, if charged by Oregon, would be eligible for the state’s drug 
court—a specialized docket “designed to rapidly place drug-af-
fected defendants into appropriate treatment programs with 
close supervision by a single judge familiar with both treatment 
and the offenders.”6 The state charges against Rosemary would 
be dropped if she completes the drug court program. No similar 
preconviction diversionary program exists in the federal system. 
After her release from prison, however, Rosemary could be eligi-
ble for the federal program based on drug courts: the District of 
Oregon’s reentry court. 
This Note explores the creation of so-called problem-solving 
courts, including state drug courts and federal reentry courts, as 
well as the future of this kind of reform within the federal crim-
inal justice system. Part I traces the development of problem-
solving courts, beginning first with state drug courts in the 
1990s, then state-based reentry courts in the early 2000s, before 
reviewing reforms to the federal system in the same period and 
the creation of federal reentry courts in the late 2000s. This Part 
offers—for the first time anywhere—a synthesis of the develop-
ment of both state and federal programs designed to address ad-
diction-related recidivism,7 and classifies these two major cate-
gories of intervention as either ex ante or ex post. Part II 
considers challenges attendant to placing an ex-ante policy in-
tervention—drug courts—in the ex-post policy context of crimi-
nal reentry. Part III offers a solution, both for (1) the creation of 
federal drug courts, either under existing statutory authority or 
 
 3. BRIAN T. YEH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. RL30722, DRUG OFFENSES: 
MAXIMUM FINES AND TERMS OF IMPRISONMENT FOR VIOLATION OF THE FED-
ERAL CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT AND RELATED LAWS 5 (2015). 
 4. OR. REV. STAT. § 475.884 (2017). 
 5. OR. REV. STAT. § 161.605 (2017). 
 6. What Is a Drug Court, LANE CTY. CIRCUIT COURT, http://www.courts 
.oregon.gov/Lane/DrugCourt/pages/drugcourtpage.aspx#dcwhat (last visited 
Jan. 30, 2018). 
 7. Recidivism is defined generally as “[t]he action of relapsing into crime, 
or reoffending, esp. habitually; the tendency to behave in this way.” Recidivism, 
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/159514? 
redirectedFrom=recidivism. For a more technical definition of the term in the 
problem-solving court context, see infra note 40. 
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the inherent power of courts to create necessary procedural tools 
to manage their dockets; and (2) for the further development of 
federal reentry courts, via (a) institutionalization of the program 
in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines; and (b) investment in fur-
ther research and development. 
I.  DEVELOPMENT OF STATE AND FEDERAL PROBLEM-
SOLVING COURTS   
Beginning in the late 1980s, largely as a response to the 
crack and methamphetamine epidemics,8 states revolutionized 
their pre- and post-conviction adjudication models for drug of-
fenders. The first innovation is what this Note will call “the ex-
ante response”: drug courts, which were designed (1) as a substi-
tute for traditional adjudicatory proceedings failing to treat the 
underlying issue of offender addiction; and (2) to intervene before 
criminal conviction.9 Through a program of “early, continuous, 
and intense judicially supervised treatment,” these programs of-
fered substance-dependent defendants an alternative to incar-
ceration.10 The apparent success of drug courts paved the way 
for a host of other specialty courts: juvenile drug courts, DUI 
courts, veterans courts, domestic violence courts, and mental 
health courts.11 These specialty courts have been generally la-
beled problem-solving courts.12 According to the National Asso-
ciation of Drug Court Professionals (NADCP), there are now 
 
 8. See, e.g., Noel Murray, “Snowfall”: Everything You Need to Know About 
FX’s Origins-of-Crack Drama, ROLLING STONE (June 30, 2017), http://www 
.rollingstone.com/tv/news/snowfall-what-you-need-to-know-about-fxs-crack-ep-
idemic-drama-w488146 (describing the new television program tracing the his-
tory of the crack cocaine epidemic in 1980s Los Angeles); The Crack Epidemic, 
U.S. DEA, https://web.archive.org/web/20060823024931/http://www.usdoj.gov/ 
dea/pubs/history/1985-1990.html. 
 9. The National Association of Drug Court Professionals (NADCP) defines 
“adult drug court” as a “specially designed court calendar or docket, . . . [de-
signed] to achieve a reduction in recidivism and substance abuse among . . . of-
fenders and to increase the offender ’s likelihood of successful habilitation.” 
Types of Drug Courts, NAT’L ASS’N OF DRUG COURT PROF ’LS, http://www.nadcp 
.org/learn/what-are-drug-courts/models (last visited Jan. 30, 2018). 
 10. Id. 
 11. See, e.g., Mitchell B. Mackinem & Paul Higgins, Introduction to PROB-
LEM-SOLVING COURTS: JUSTICE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY?, at vii (Paul 
Higgins & Mitchell B. Mackinem eds., 2009). 
 12. Id. (“Problem-solving courts are local courts that seek to remedy detri-
mental community conditions through sustained attention and through possible 
therapeutic interventions with individual offenders who experience debilitating 
personal conditions.”). 
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more than 1200 non-drug-court problem-solving courts operat-
ing in all fifty states and the District of Columbia.13 
The next innovation this Note will refer to as “the ex-post 
response”: reentry courts, which were designed to reduce recidi-
vism after an offender is released from prison as part of a crimi-
nal conviction for drug crimes.14 Following a generation of exper-
imentation at the state level, Article III judges began to modify 
and adapt the reentry model for application to federal courts.15 
To understand the development of federal reentry courts, 
one must first understand the development of their state court 
analogues. Section A reviews the history of state drug courts and 
their efforts to combat addiction-based recidivism. Section B dis-
cusses the genesis of post-incarceration reentry courts at the 
state level. Section C examines the application of these models 
to federal courts. 
A. HISTORY OF STATE DRUG COURTS 
The first drug court in the United States was established by 
Dade County, Florida16 in 1989.17 A response to the crack-co-
caine epidemic,18 it operated as an alternative to incarceration.19 
Participants had moderate-to-severe substance abuse issues and 
 
 13. Problem Solving Courts, NAT’L ASS’N DRUG COURT PROF ’LS, http://www 
.nadcp.org/learn/what-are-drug-courts/types-drug-courts/problem-solving 
-courts (last visited Jan. 30, 2018). 
 14. The NADCP defines “reentry drug court” as one which “utilize[s] the 
drug court model . . . to facilitate the reintegration of drug-involved offenders 
into communities upon their release from local or state correctional facilities.” 
NAT’L ASS’N DRUG COURT PROF ’LS, supra note 9. 
 15. The National Drug Court Institute defines federal reentry courts as 
“post-incarceration, cooperative effort[s] of the U.S. District Courts, U.S. Proba-
tion Office, Federal Public Defender and U.S. Attorney’s Office . . . providing a 
blend of treatment and sanction alternatives to address re-integration into the 
community for nonviolent, substance-abusing offenders released from federal 
prison.” WEST HUDDLESTON & DOUGLAS B. MARLOWE, NAT’L DRUG COURT 
INST., PAINTING THE CURRENT PICTURE: A NATIONAL REPORT ON DRUG COURTS 
AND OTHER PROBLEM-SOLVING COURT PROGRAMS IN THE UNITED STATES 44 
(2011). 
 16. The name of the county was changed to Miami-Dade in 1997.  
 17. Greg Berman, Problem-Solving Justice and the Moment of Truth, in 
PROBLEM-SOLVING COURTS: JUSTICE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY?, supra 
note 11, at 1, 4; see also JEFFREY TAUBER & KATHLEEN R. SNAVELY, NAT’L DRUG 
COURT INST., DRUG COURTS: A RESEARCH AGENDA 1 (Apr. 1999). 
 18. DOUGLAS B. MARLOWE ET AL., NAT’L DRUG COURT INST., PAINTING THE 
CURRENT PICTURE: NATIONAL REPORT ON DRUG COURTS AND OTHER PROBLEM-
SOLVING COURT PROGRAMS IN THE UNITED STATES 13 fig.1 (2016) [hereinafter 
NDCI REPORT]. 
 19. Id. at 11. 
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were charged with a drug-related offense.20 “[C]areer criminals 
[or] violent offenders,” however, were not allowed into the pro-
gram.21 Participants were required to complete a treatment pro-
gram, refrain from drug or alcohol use for a significant period of 
time (enforced through frequent random urinalysis tests), re-
main arrest free, follow supervision conditions, and pursue edu-
cation or employment.22 
The Dade County drug court differed from a typical adver-
sarial proceeding. Instead of acting as a disinterested neutral, 
the judge was “the leader of a multidisciplinary team of profes-
sionals” composed of the prosecutor, defense attorney, probation 
officer, and representatives from treatment and service organi-
zations.23 As one prosecutor who participated in the program 
noted, “In this court all of us are public defenders, really.”24 The 
team met before each bimonthly or monthly session to confer 
about participant progress, and to recommend either rewards or 
consequences to be handed down by the judge during the ses-
sion.25 These “incentives and sanctions [we]re moderate in mag-
nitude and delivered with certainty.”26 Once a participant suc-
cessfully completed the program, they were diverted out of the 
criminal justice system without a conviction on their record27—
avoiding both the high costs of incarceration28 and the collateral 
consequences that follow conviction.29 These twin benefits to 
 
 20. Id. 
 21. Ronald Smothers, Miami Tries Treatment, Not Jail, in Drug Cases, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 19, 1993, at A10. 
 22. NDCI REPORT, supra note 18, at 11. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Smothers, supra note 21. 
 25. NDCI REPORT, supra note 18, at 11. 
 26. Id. at 17. 
 27. Id. at 11 (noting the varying methods of post-completion impacts on 
criminal records). 
 28. See Annual Determination of Average Cost of Incarceration, 80 Fed. 
Reg. 12523 (Mar. 09, 2015) (finding the “average cost of incarceration for Fed-
eral inmates in Fiscal Year 2014 was $30,619.85 ($83.89 per day)”); see also 
Marc Santora, City’s Annual Cost Per Inmate Is $168,000, Study Finds, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 24, 2013, at A16 (noting the “annual average taxpayer cost in [forty 
participating] states was $31,286 per inmate”). 
 29. See, e.g., MARGARET COLGATE LOVE ET AL., COLLATERAL CONSE-
QUENCES OF CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS: LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE § 2.1 (2016) 
(listing specific categories of collateral consequences). “Persons convicted of 
crimes are subject to a wide variety of sanctions and restrictions in addition to 
the sentence imposed by the court. These so-called ‘collateral consequences’ of 
conviction are frequently more punitive and long-lasting than court-imposed 
sanctions like a prison term or fine.” Id. at § 1.2. 
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both offender and society have been a selling point of drug courts 
since their inception in Miami,30 and are a hallmark of the ex-
ante approach to combating addiction-related recidivism.  
This model was based largely on a recognition that “tradi-
tional threats of punishment and probation do not deter drug use 
by the majority of individuals struggling with addiction.”31 Drug 
courts “obtain [their] results by integrating treatment, close su-
pervision, frequent drug testing, sanctions for court violations, 
and incentives for compliant behavior.”32 Then-Dade County 
State Attorney Janet Reno was instrumental in creating the first 
drug court,33 and, after becoming Attorney General of the United 
States in 1993,34 she instituted a series of grants to incentivize 
state and local governments to replicate the model around the 
country.35 After Reno’s first year at the Department of Justice, 
 
 30. See Smothers, supra note 21 (noting that the “program costs about $1.2 
million [which] translated into about $500 to $700 a person a year, roughly the 
cost of jailing an offender for nine days”). 
 31. Caitlinrose Fisher, Treating the Disease or Punishing the Criminal?: Ef-
fectively Using Drug Court Sanctions to Treat Substance Use Disorder and De-
crease Criminal Conduct, 99 MINN. L. REV. 747, 747–48 (2014); see also Richard 
L. Wiener & Leah Georges, Social Psychology and Problem-Solving Courts: Ju-
dicial Roles and Decision Making, in PROBLEM SOLVING COURTS: SOCIAL SCI-
ENCE AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 1, 4 (Richard L. Wiener & Eve M. Brank eds., 
2013) (noting that “traditional tools of the criminal justice system . . . [such as] 
deterrence [and] incapacitation . . . are ill suited to address the personal and 
psychological failings of lawbreakers who suffer from underlying social and psy-
chological dysfunction[s]” such as addiction). 
 32. Fisher, supra note 31, at 748 (citation omitted). 
 33. See Smothers, supra note 21 (noting that according to participating 
judges, the program “could not [have] operate[d]” without Reno’s support). 
 34. Reno’s nomination may have been due, at least in part, to the Dade 
County Drug Court. At the Rose Garden press conference where he announced 
Reno as his nominee to lead the Justice Department, President Clinton listed 
among his reasons for selecting her, “[s]he launched a drug court program that 
has become nationally acclaimed that gets young first-time offenders back on 
track.” Attorney General Nomination, C-SPAN, https://www.c-span.org/video/ 
?37897-1/attorney-general-nomination (Feb. 11, 1993). He then added, “[I]f I 
might be permitted a little personal moment, I’ve had a high regard for Janet 
Reno for some time because my brother-in-law [Hugh Rodham] is the defense 
attorney in the drug court . . . so I’ve known about her exploits for some time.” 
Id.  
 35. See, e.g., Randy Kennedy, Drug Court Seeks End to Revolving-Door Jus-
tice, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 1996, at B3 (“The court is modeled after the first such 
court, started in Miami in 1990 with the help of Janet Reno, then the prosecutor 
in drug-plagued Dade County, Fla. As United States Attorney General, Ms. 
Reno is now championing the creation of drug courts around the country. She 
presented grants for nine new courts on May 9.”); Mireya Navarro, Experi-
mental Courts Are Using New Strategies to Blunt the Lure of Drugs, N.Y. TIMES, 
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there were nineteen drug courts in the United States.36 At the 
end of her tenure,37 in 2000, there were 665.38 Today, there are 
more than 3000 drug courts, located in all fifty states and the 
District of Columbia.39 
While federal funding and support were key to the rapid 
adoption of drug courts by the states, so too was their strong 
track record of success; studies found that the average drug court 
reduced recidivism by eight to fourteen percent,40 and the best-
performing drug courts reduced recidivism by between thirty-
five to eighty percent.41 Additionally, studies found the programs 
to be “highly cost-effective . . . produc[ing] an average return on 
investment of approximately $2 to $4 for every $1 invested.”42 
Even researchers critical of problem-solving courts acknowledge 
they “generat[e] actual and potential cost savings and substan-
tially reduc[e] drug use and recidivism while offenders are in the 
program . . . and to a lesser but still significant extent . . . after 
they leave the program.”43 
 
Oct. 17, 1996, at A25 (“Attorney General Janet Reno, who was the chief prose-
cutor in Dade County when the first drug court was established in Miami in 
1989, has pushed to expand the program nationwide and doubled spending on 
it this year, to $30 million.”). 
 36. NDCI REPORT, supra note 18, at 34 tbl.3. 
 37. Reno served as Attorney General of the United States from March 11, 
1993 to January 20, 2001, the second-longest term in the history of the republic. 
See Jane Onyanga-Omara & Kevin Johnson, Janet Reno, First Female U.S. At-
torney General, Dies at 78, USA TODAY (Nov. 7, 2016), https://www.usatoday 
.com/story/news/nation/2016/11/07/reports-janet-reno-first-female-us-attorney 
-general-dies/93412386. 
 38. NDCI REPORT, supra note 18, at 34 tbl.3. 
 39. Id. The NDCI Report indicates there were 3057 drug courts as of De-
cember 31, 2014. Id. The National Institute of Justice (NIJ) website has an up-
dated figure of 3142 as of June, 2015. Drug Courts, NAT’L INSTITUTE JUST., 
https://www.nij.gov/topics/courts/drug-courts/Pages/welcome.aspx (last up-
dated Jan. 10, 2017). 
 40. NDCI REPORT, supra note 18, at 15 (citation omitted). Recidivism is de-
fined as “rearrest rates over at least two years.” Id. (citation omitted). 
 41. Id. (citation omitted). 
 42. Id. (citation omitted). Wide adoption of problem-solving courts “may 
also reflect a broader [societal] transition from punitive and retributive punish-
ment to therapeutic and restorative justice.” Fisher, supra note 31, at 755 (cita-
tion omitted). For a seminal discussion of the concept of therapeutic justice, see 
David B. Wexler, Therapeutic Justice, 57 MINN. L. REV. 289 (1972). 
 43. Steven Belenko, Research on Drug Courts: A Critical Review, I DRUG 
CT. REV. 10, 29 (1998). 
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B. DEVELOPMENT OF STATE REENTRY COURTS 
1. Growth of Prison Population 
Despite the demonstrated impact of problem-solving courts, 
participation was limited to a narrow subset of offenders: those 
with eligible charges like “nonviolent drug offenses, theft, or 
other crimes stemming from the participant’s underlying addic-
tion.”44 Such programs, in particular, did not reach already in-
carcerated persons—whose numbers were rapidly growing. The 
number of adults incarcerated at the state and local level grew 
seventy-eight percent—from 1,048,800 to 1,834,300—in the dec-
ade following the 1989 founding of the Dade County drug court.45 
Over that same period of time, there was a significant shift from 
indeterminate to determinate sentencing at both the state and 
federal levels.46 Under an indeterminate model, judges hand 
down sentences with a range of time to serve, such as ten to 
twenty-five years.47 The lower end of the range was believed to 
be the minimum sentence necessary to serve as a punitive re-
sponse to the crime; the remainder could be served on parole, so 
long as the offender demonstrated to a parole board that he or 
she was sufficiently rehabilitated.48 With the advent of determi-
nate sentencing, states created commissions to set guidelines de-
signed to limit judicial discretion in sentencing and ensure of-
fenders served the full term of their sentence.49 The degree to 
which determinate sentencing led to increased incarceration 
rates in the states is contested, with data showing those states 
 
 44. Fisher, supra note 31, at 754 n.32 (citation omitted); see also supra note 
21 and accompanying text. 
 45. See Total Adult Correctional Population, 1980–2015, BUREAU OF JUS-
TICE STATISTICS, https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=kfdetail&iid=487# (last vis-
ited Jan. 30, 2018). 
 46. See Beth Schwartzapfel, The Power and Politics of Our Parole Boards, 
WASH. POST, July 12, 2015, at A1 (noting that “[f ]ourteen states and the federal 
government eliminated or severely restricted parole” and turned to determinate 
sentencing schemes). 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id.; see also JOAN PETERSILIA, WHEN PRISONERS COME HOME: PAROLE 
AND PRISONER REENTRY 12–13 (2003). In 1977, discretionary release, which had 
to be “earned” by offenders, accounted for eighty-eight percent of state prison 
releases. Id. In 2000, it had fallen to twenty-four percent, with mandatory re-
leased increasing to forty-one percent. Id. at 13. Minnesota became the first 
state to create such a system in 1978, with its guidelines coming into operation 
in 1981. About MSCG, MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM’N., https://mn 
.gov/sentencing-guidelines/about (last visited Jan. 30, 2018). 
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using sentencing guidelines “experienced below-average incre-
ments of prison growth, compared to a national baseline, in the 
time period following their implementation of guidelines.”50 At 
the same time, states also adopted “mandatory minimums and 
‘three strikes’ laws . . . ratchet[ing] up criminal sentences [and] 
result[ing] in dramatically longer terms of imprisonment than 
had previously been the norm.”51 The total state prison popula-
tion peaked at 1,407,400 in 2009;52 the federal prison population 
peaked at 217,800 in 2012.53 As of 2015, there were 1,526,800 
incarcerated persons at the state and federal level.54 
2. Growth of reentry population 
While the causes of mass incarceration phenomenon are 
widely debated today,55 one critical facet of this phenomenon in-
volves the growing number of previously incarcerated persons 
returning to their communities. This reintegration of offenders 
is called prisoner reentry.56 Reentry is a reality for ninety-three 
percent of all incarcerated persons.57 Combined state and federal 
annual prisoner releases first crossed the half-million mark in 
1997, and peaked at 734,144 in 2008.58 There were 580,871 state 
offenders and 60,156 federal offenders released in 2015.59 
For reentering persons, the period after release is fraught 
with temptation and danger. A 2005 Department of Justice 
 
 50. Kevin R. Reitz, Don’t Blame Determinacy: U.S. Incarceration Growth 
Has Been Driven by Other Forces, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1787, 1799 (2006). 
 51. Kelsey McCowan Heilman, Why Vague Sentencing Guidelines Violate 
the Due Process Clause, 95 OR. L. REV. 53, 63 n.58 (citing Peter W. Low, Marvin 
E. Frankel’s Criminal Sentences: Law Without Order, 87 HARV. L. REV. 687 
(1974) (book review) (predicting the result)). 
 52. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 45. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. For an excellent discussion of the racial and socioeconomic implications 
of mass incarceration, see generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM 
CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010). 
 56. PETERSILIA, supra note 49, at 3 (defining prisoner reentry as “all activ-
ities and programming conducted to prepare ex-convicts to return safely to the 
community and to live as law-abiding citizens”). 
 57. Id. Prisoners with life or capital sentences—and those who unexpect-
edly die while incarcerated—are the only offenders who would not need to even-
tually reenter society. Id. 
 58. E. ANN CARSON & DANIELA GOLINELLI, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATIS-
TICS, PRISONERS IN 2012: TRENDS IN ADMISSIONS AND RELEASES 1991–2012, at 
4 tbl.2 (2014). 
 59. E. ANN CARSON & ELIZABETH ANDERSON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATIS-
TICS, PRISONERS IN 2015, at 11 tbl.7 (2016).  
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(DOJ) study of prisoners released in thirty states found that (a) 
more than a quarter were rearrested within six months of re-
lease; (b) two-thirds were rearrested within three years; and (c) 
three-quarters were rearrested within five years.60 The two-
thirds rearrest rate has been documented for nearly a half-cen-
tury, having first appeared in 1969,61 and appearing in two DOJ 
cohort studies (similar to the one mentioned above) undertaken 
in 1983 and 1994.62 Of those rearrested within five years of re-
lease, fifty-seven percent are arrested within the first year.63 
Given these remarkably stable statistics, it appears there is a 
strong need for interventions designed to keep reentering offend-
ers from reoffending, and that “the most intensive services and 
surveillance should begin immediately upon release and be 
front-loaded in the first . . . year.”64 
What form that intervention should take was under debate 
in the waning years of Reno’s tenure as Attorney General. In the 
spring of 2000, Jeremey Travis was finishing his six years as di-
rector of the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) at DOJ.65 As he 
prepared to leave, he wrote what he called a “provocative pro-
posal” regarding reentry.66 He suggested the reentry process 
“should begin at sentencing and continue throughout the period 
of release,”67 and noted that the “traditional function of parole 
boards—deciding release dates for prisoners—has been severely 
diminished, if not eliminated” by the move to determinate sen-
tencing regimes.68 Travis wondered, in the absence of parole 
board oversight, what institution could best serve as the “man-
ager” of the reentry process.69 After considering probation/parole 
supervision agencies and correctional institutions and finding 
both insufficient,70 he turned to the example of problem-solving 
courts.71 He admired very much their “finely calibrated use of 
 
 60. MATTHEW R. DUROSE ET AL., RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS RELEASED IN 
30 STATES IN 2005: PATTERNS FROM 2005 TO 2010, at 8 tbl.8 (2014). 
 61. PETERSILIA, supra note 49, at 141. 
 62. Id. at 141–42. 
 63. DUROSE ET AL., supra note 60, at 7. 
 64. PETERSILIA, supra note 49, at 153. 
 65. Jeremy Travis, JOHN JAY COLL. OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, 
www.jjay.cuny.edu/faculty/jeremy-travis (last visited Jan. 30, 2018). 
 66. Jeremy Travis, But They All Come Back: Rethinking Prisoner Reentry, 
7 SENT’G & CORRECTIONS, May 2000, at 1, 8. 
 67. Id. at 2 (emphasis added). 
 68. Id. at 3. 
 69. Id. at 2. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 4. 
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the scarce resources of judicial authority and prison capacity to 
achieve demonstrable changes in behavior.”72 Travis argued that 
a system (1) where the “success and failure at meeting the con-
ditions of post conviction release are . . . carefully monitored by 
a figure having the moral authority of a drug court judge;” (2) 
with “clearly delineated consequences for failure;” and (3) which 
made “sparing use of prison,” could achieve results similar to 
those of drug courts.73 
Travis ultimately suggested such a system, and gave it a 
name: reentry court.74 In his model, Travis envisioned that the 
sentencing judge would preside over the whole reentry process, 
since “creating a supervisory role for judges . . . gives them far 
greater capacity to achieve the purposes of sentencing.”75 A “sig-
nificant purpose of [one’s] activities behind bars would be prep-
aration for reentry” and offenders would begin treatment and 
training programs linked to those they would undertake after 
release.76 Similarly to those in drug court programs, participants 
would, once back in their community, have to meet a series of 
conditions pertaining to treatment, employment, and reintegra-
tion into society.77 If they failed to meet those obligations, they 
would be punished “in amounts proportionate to [their] fail-
ure.”78 If they achieved their goals, the judge could “accelerate 
the completion of [their] sentence,” “return privileges that might 
be lost,” and “welcome [them] back to the community.”79 Travis, 
in sum, envisioned applying the ex-ante drug court model to the 
ex-post context of reentry—and extending the sentencing judge’s 
responsibility to the life of that process. 
Attorney General Reno was strongly supportive of Travis’s 
proposal, and in 2000 she directed the Office of Justice Programs 
(OJP) to create a series of reentry-related programs, including 
the Reentry Court Initiative (RCI).80 As part of RCI, OJP “se-
lected and provided technical support to nine states to imple-
ment pilot reentry courts.”81 The pilot courts were located in: 
 
 72. Id. at 5. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 8. 
 75. Id. at 8. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 9. 
 78. Id. at 8.  
 79. Id. 
 80. Stephen E. Vance, Federal Reentry Court Programs: A Summary of Re-
cent Evaluations, 75 FED. PROB. 64, 65 (2011). 
 81. Id. 
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California (San Francisco) 
Colorado (El Paso County) 
Delaware (two distinct programs: New Castle County and 
Sussex County) 
Florida (Broward County) 
Iowa (Cedar Rapids) 
Kentucky (two distinct programs: Fayette County and 
Campbell and Kenton counties) 
New York (the Harlem area) 
Ohio (Richland County) 
West Virginia (Mineral, Tucker, and Grant counties)82 
A 2003 evaluation of the pilot courts found that “it is essen-
tial [for reentry courts] to agree on the target population” eligible 
to participate, since, “unlike drug courts, . . . ‘reentry courts that 
target the general population of returning offenders have to meet 
a diverse set of needs extending far beyond substance abuse 
treatment.’”83 
Subsequent evaluations of state reentry courts84 have found 
that successful programs require even greater flexibility than ex-
ists in the drug court context, with judges needing “a higher level 
of tolerance for technical violations, such as ‘dirty [drug] tests’” 
in order to “dole out [the] graduated punishments” necessary to 
“get the offender back on track and improve the odds of success-
ful graduation.”85 A recent evaluation of the Harlem court, cre-
ated under the Reno-era RCI program, found participants were 
less likely to be rearrested, and less likely to be reconvicted, 
 
 82. CHRISTINE LINDQUIST ET AL., REENTRY COURTS PROCESS EVALUATION 
(PHASE 1), FINAL REPORT 5 (2003). 
 83. Vance, supra note 80, at 65 (quoting LINDQUIST ET AL., supra note 82, 
at 52–53).  
 84. Hawaii, in 2004, became the first state to implement a state-wide pro-
bation reform initiative, called Project HOPE (Hawaii’s Opportunity Probation 
with Enforcement). While not a reentry court, its procedures are designed to 
achieve the same ends, with the state’s entire probation population as the target 
population. Fisher, supra note 31, at 758–59 (citing HOPE Probation, 
HAW. STATE JUDICIARY, http://www.courts.state.hi.us/special_projects/hope/ 
about_hope_probation (last visited Jan. 30, 2018)); see also Steven S. Alm, A 
New Continuum for Court Supervision, 91 OR. L. REV. 1181, 1184 (2013). Sev-
eral states, including those with reentry courts, have adopted the HOPE proba-
tion model. See, e.g., H.B. 1052, 2016 Reg. Sess. (La. 2016) (establishing the 
Swift and Certain Probation Pilot Program); Paul Suarez, New Approach to Pro-
bation, COLUMBIAN (Vancouver, Wash.), May 23, 2012, at A1. 
 85. Rodney Villazor, Reentry Courts: An Examination of the “Provocative 
Proposal” in Practice, 28 FED. SENT’G REP. 253, 254 n.35 (2016) (quoting ROB-
ERT V. WOLF, CTR. FOR COURT INNOVATION, REENTRY COURTS: LOOKING AHEAD 
9 (2011)). 
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though they were more likely to have their parole revoked.86 Re-
searchers were unsure what to make of the data indicating in-
creased levels of revocation, but suspect that the intensified su-
pervision of reentry court could be responsible.87 
Support for reentry programs, including reentry courts, has 
been strongly bipartisan. President George W. Bush signed the 
Second Chance Act of 2007 into law on April 9, 2008.88 The law 
“reauthorize[d] and expand[ed] state and local re-entry demon-
stration projects that provide family reunification, job training, 
education, housing, substance abuse treatment and mental 
health services to adult and juvenile offenders and their fami-
lies.”89 It also created the National Reentry Resource Center, 
which “provides education, training, and technical assistance to 
states, tribes, territories, local governments, service providers, 
non-profit organizations, and corrections institutions working on 
prisoner reentry.”90 In 2011, Attorney General Eric Holder “es-
tablished a Cabinet-level federal interagency Reentry Council, 
representing a significant executive branch commitment to coor-
dinating re-entry efforts and advancing effective re-entry poli-
cies.”91 
President Obama officially chartered the Federal Inter-
agency Reentry Council in April of 2016.92 Today, there are forty-
 
 86. WOLF, supra note 85, at 4. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Pub. L. No. 110-199, 122 Stat. 657 (2008). 
 89. Rhonda McMillion, Getting Out—and Staying Out, A.B.A. J., Dec. 2007, 
at 64, 64; see also Michael M. O’Hear, The Second Chance Act and the Future of 
Reentry Reform, 20 FED. SENT’G REP. 75, 75 (2007) (predicting that “Passage of 
the [Second Chance Act will] galvanize an emerging reentry reform movement 
and highlight the increasing importance of reentry in the national dialogue on 
crime and punishment”); Erik Eckholm, U.S. Shifting Prison Focus to Re-Entry 
into Society, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2008, at A23; Editorial, A Second Chance, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 20, 2008, at A22 (calling on Congress to appropriate $330 million 
to fully fund the Second Chance Act). But see Editorial, The Second Chance Act 
Proves Its Worth, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2014, at A20 (noting that while the Act 
is proving successful, Congress appropriated only $67.7 million in fiscal year 
2014 to support its programs). 
 90. BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ABOUT THE NA-
TIONAL REENTRY RESOURCE CENTER, https://www.bja.gov/publications/ 
nationalreentryresourcecenter.pdf (last visited Jan. 30, 2018). 
 91. The Attorney General’s Reentry Council, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, DEP’T 
OF JUSTICE, https://www.nij.gov/journals/270/pages/criminal-records-council 
.aspx (last visited Jan. 30, 2018). 
 92. Barack Obama, The President’s Role in Advancing Criminal Justice Re-
form, 130 HARV. L. REV. 811, 833 (2017); see also Press Release, Office of the 
Press Sec’y, Presidential Memorandum—Promoting Rehabilitation and Reinte-
gration of Formerly Incarcerated Individuals (Apr. 29, 2016), https:// 
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three state reentry courts.93 While they represent only a fraction 
of the more than 1200 state problem-solving courts operating to-
day,94 they represent a critical development in the experiment 
begun in Miami almost three decades ago: they apply the ex-ante 
approach of drug courts to the ex-post context of reentry.  
C. PROBLEM-SOLVING COURTS AND THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 
During the period where states responded to rising drug 
crime by both passing harsher laws95 and creating innovative 
programs like the Dade County drug court, the federal govern-
ment pursued an exclusively “tough-on-crime” approach. This led 
the federal and state justice systems to become increasingly di-
vergent in their approaches to drug crime. President Reagan 
first sought and won passage of the Comprehensive Crime Con-
trol Act of 198496—described by then-Associate Attorney Gen-
eral D. Lowell Jensen “the most significant change in the Fed-
eral system of criminal law”97—which (1) abolished parole for 
federal crimes; (2) established the U.S. Sentencing Commission 
(USSC) to promulgate determinate sentencing guidelines; (3) al-
lowed for preventative detention of persons accused of crimes; (4) 
narrowed the federal insanity defense; and (5) increased civil for-
feiture powers of federal law enforcement in drug cases.98 Ac-
cording to then-Attorney General William French Smith, the law 
was designed to “restore the proper balance between the forces 
of law and the forces of lawlessness.”99 President Reagan later 
signed both the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986100 and the Anti-
Drug Abuse Act of 1988.101 These laws significantly increased, 
through the use of mandatory minimum sentences, the penalties 
for drug crimes—especially crack-cocaine, which had been the 
 
obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/04/29/presidential 
-memorandum-promoting-rehabilitation-and-reintegration (last visited Jan. 
30, 2018). 
 93. See Find a Drug Court, NAT’L DRUG COURT RES. CTR., http://www.ndcrc 
.org/map (last visited Jan. 30, 2018). 
 94. NAT’L ASS’N DRUG COURT PROF ’LS, supra note 9 (“As of June 30, 2012, 
there were 1,122 problem-solving courts in the U.S.”). 
 95. See Heilman, supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
 96. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976 (1984). 
 97. Leslie Maitland Werner, Getting Out the Word on the New Crime Act, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 1984, at A24. 
 98. Loretta Tofani, The Harder Line on Federal Crime, WASH. POST, Dec. 
28, 1984, at A1. 
 99. Werner, supra note 97. 
 100. Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986). 
 101. Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 (1988).  
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genesis of the first problem-solving courts.102 The results were 
explosive, and “ushered in a period of remarkable prison growth 
in the federal system.”103 The federal prison population grew 
143% from 1980 to 1989,104 and 267% from 1980 to 1993.105 State 
and local prison populations increased 114% and 174% over the 
same periods.106 
As part of the legislation creating the federal determinative 
sentencing scheme and the USSC, Congress abolished parole in 
the federal system and established in its place supervised re-
lease, “a ‘unique’ type of post-confinement monitoring . . . over-
seen by federal district courts with the assistance of federal pro-
bation officers.”107 With the abolition of federal parole, “Congress 
intended supervised release to assist individuals in their transi-
tion [back] to community life . . . fulfill[ing] rehabilitative ends, 
distinct from those served by incarceration.”108 
A term of supervised release may be imposed at the time of 
an offender’s sentencing, though only a few crimes require impo-
sition of supervised release.109 If not mandated by the statute 
under which the offender was convicted, the sentencing judge 
has broad discretion in setting the term and conditions of super-
vised release.110 While sentencing judges are not generally re-
quired to impose a term of supervised release, they do in an es-
timated ninety-five111 to ninety-nine112 percent of federal 
 
 102. Tracy Thompson, Cracking Down, Reluctantly, On Low-Level Drug Of-
fenders, WASH. POST, Aug. 28, 1989, at A1. 
 103. Reitz, supra note 50, at 1799. 
 104. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 45. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FEDERAL OFFENDERS SENTENCED TO SU-
PERVISED RELEASE 1 (2010) [hereinafter USSC REPORT]. 
 108. United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53, 59 (2000). 
 109. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(a) (2012) (noting supervised release is required for 
those convicted of “domestic violence crime[s]” and others “required by statute”). 
 110. Id. § 3583(d). The only limits are that any condition must “comport with 
the purposes of sentencing; involve ‘no greater deprivation of liberty than is rea-
sonably necessary’” to accomplish those purposes, and be consistent with USSC 
policy. See Lisa A. Rich, A Federal Certificate of Rehabilitation Program: Provid-
ing Federal Ex-Offenders More Opportunity for Successful Reentry, 7 ALA. C.R. 
& C.L. L. REV. 249, 279 (2016). 
 111. Christine S. Scott-Hayward, Shadow Sentencing: The Imposition of 
Federal Supervised Release, 18 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 180, 182 (2013) (“Between 
2005 and 2009, more than 95 percent of people in the federal system . . . [were] 
sentenced to a term of supervised release.”). 
 112. Villazor, supra note 85, at 254 (noting 99.1 percent of nonmandated of-
fenders still received a term of supervised release at sentencing). 
 1396 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [102:1381 
 
sentencings. From 2005 to 2009, the average supervised release 
term was forty-one months.113 The supervising judge may, after 
one year, terminate a term of supervised release.114 However, in 
recent years, only twelve percent of offenders on supervised re-
lease received early termination.115 On average, two-thirds of of-
fenders successfully complete their term of supervised release,116 
and one-third have their supervised release status revoked “as a 
result of commission of new offenses or other violations of the[ir] 
conditions.”117 
Over the years that followed, the divergence of state and fed-
eral responses to drug crime was becoming clear, but Congress 
failed to act and address the disparity. On October 12, 2000, Sen-
ator Robert Torricelli (D-NJ) introduced the Drug Court Act of 
2000.118 The bill authorized DOJ to establish federal drug courts 
in ten high-crime districts119 by partnering with local state-run 
drug court programs.120 The bill was referred to the Senate Ju-
diciary Committee, but never received a hearing or vote. Similar 
legislation does not appear to have been introduced in the years 
following. In November of 2004, Judge Donald P. Lay121 of the 
Eighth Circuit published an op-ed in the New York Times titled 
“Rehab Justice.”122 He argued that “[m]andatory minimum sen-
tences, enacted by Congress, have contributed to the rising costs 
of imprisonment and crowding in federal prisons,” noted that 
“[u]nlike the states, the federal criminal justice system offers no 
alternatives for nonviolent offenders charged with drug-related 
crimes,” and called on Congress to “pass[] legislation to carry out 
a program for federal drug courts.”123 The financial and human 
 
 113. USSC REPORT, supra note 107, at 55 tbl.1. 
 114. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1). 
 115. USSC REPORT, supra note 107, at 62. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 63. 
 118. S. 3191, 106th Cong. (2000). 
 119. Id. § 3(a). 
 120. Id. § 3(b). 
 121. Judge Lay was appointed to the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit by President Johnson in 1966. He served as chief judge from 
1979–1992. He assumed senior status in 1992, and passed away in 2007. Bio-
graphical Directory of Federal Judges, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/ 
history/judges/lay-donald-pomery (last visited Jan. 30, 2018).  
 122. Donald P. Lay, Opinion, Rehab Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2004, at 
A31. 
 123. Id. But see U.S. PRETRIAL SERVS. AGENCY, U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THE 
DIST. OF E.N.Y, ALTERNATIVES TO INCARCERATION IN THE EASTERN DISTRICT 
OF NEW YORK 7–11, 35–47 (2015) [hereinafter EDNY ALTERNATIVES REPORT] 
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cost of the current regime, Judge Lay argued, was too great.124 
No action was taken in response to his suggestion. 
While Congress failed to specifically authorize the creation 
of something resembling state drug courts,125 it had given judges 
broad authority to structure the terms and conditions of federal 
supervised release.126 Federal judges took advantage of this au-
thority to create federal reentry courts. The first, called the Su-
pervision Treatment and Re-entry (STAR) Program, was created 
in 2002 by Judge Charles Sifton of the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of New York (EDNY).127 The 
STAR program targets “persons with drug or alcohol problems” 
in order to provide “more assistance, stricter accountability[,] 
and greater rewards for completing their supervision success-
fully.”128 Other pioneering federal reentry courts include the Dis-
trict of Oregon (2005), the Western District of Michigan (2005), 
the District of Massachusetts (2006), the Southern District of 
Mississippi (2006), the Southern District of Indiana (2007), the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania (2007), the Eastern District of 
Utah (2008) and the Eastern District of Missouri (2008).129 
These courts are “designed to reward good behavior that is in-
compatible with drug use and crime,” using graduated sanctions 
 
(describing sixteen “drug court” programs in various federal districts). These 
federal “alternative to incarceration” (ATI) programs, unlike most state drug 
courts, still result in conviction and sentencing of participating offenders. Id. at 
11. 
 124. Lay, supra note 122. 
 125. Id. Contra CHARLES P. SIFTON & JACK B. WEINSTEIN, REPORT ON A PRO-
POSED INTENSIVE POST-SENTENCE DRUG SUPERVISION PROGRAM FOR THE EAST-
ERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 11 (2006) (on file with author) (arguing that United 
States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), and “the inherent power of . . . district 
court judges to fashion appropriate sentences under 18 U.S.C. § 3553” provide 
sufficient legal authority for federal judges to impose state drug court-like de-
ferred or alternative sentences). See also EDNY ALTERNATIVES REPORT, supra 
note 123, at 63 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3154 as legal authority for the EDNY Pretrial 
Opportunity Program, a pre-sentencing diversionary program based on state 
drug courts). This author is indebted to Judge Weinstein for his assistance in 
locating copies of these reports, and for additional materials on EDNY program 
innovation. 
 126. See supra note 110 and accompanying text. 
 127. See SIFTON & WEINSTEIN, supra note 125, at 1; see also DANIEL W. 
CLOSE ET AL., THE DISTRICT OF OREGON REENTRY COURT: EVALUATION, POLICY 
RECOMMENDATIONS, AND REPLICATION STRATEGIES 1 (2008); Andrew S. Harris, 
The STAR Program in the Eastern District of New York, FED. B. COUNCIL Q. 
(Aug. 21, 2014), http://www.federalbarcouncilquarterly.org/?p=315; EDNY AL-
TERNATIVES REPORT, supra note 123, at 48. 
 128. SIFTON & WEINSTEIN, supra note 125, at 1. 
 129. CLOSE ET AL., supra note 127, at 2. 
 1398 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [102:1381 
 
to change behavior.130 They generally feature a reentry team 
comprised of a federal district court judge or magistrate judge,131 
a federal public defender, an assistant U.S. attorney, an officer 
from the district’s Office of Probation and Pretrial Services, and 
representatives of the treatment and service provider communi-
ties.132 Fifteen years after Judge Sifton applied Travis’s “provoc-
ative proposal” to the Article III context and created STAR in 
Brooklyn, the number of federal reentry courts has grown to at 
least forty-six.133 
Ultimately, these two lines of innovation—ex-ante diver-
sionary programs and ex-post recidivism reduction programs—
seek to address the same issue, but in sometimes conflicting 
ways, and with very different results. This Part identified the 
history and markers of both sets of interventions; Part II will 
describe the tension in using one form (ex-post) to achieve the 
goals of the other (ex-ante). 
II.  THE EX-ANTE/EX-POST PROBLEM   
The federal reentry court was born of compromise. States, 
ever serving as laboratories of democracy,134 sought to combat 
addiction-based recidivism through programs designed to both 
avoid incarceration and treat the underlying problem of sub-
stance abuse. After those programs proved successful, states ex-
panded the model to other contexts, including reentry. When 
Congress failed to provide an ex-ante diversionary program at 
the federal level, judges made use of their supervised release 
powers to create the federal reentry model sua sponte. 
 
 130. Laurel Beeler, Federal Reentry Courts and Other New Models of Super-
vision, 60 FED. LAW. 55, 56–57 (2013). 
 131. Magistrate judgeships are authorized under the Federal Magistrates 
Act of 1968, 28 U.S.C. §§ 631–639 (2012). Magistrates are appointed by the 
judges of a federal district court for renewable terms of eight years, rather than 
being confirmed by the U.S. Senate for life tenure. PETER G. MCCABE, FED. BAR 
ASS’N, A GUIDE TO THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATE SYSTEM 7 (2014). They are em-
powered to “hear and determine non-dispositive motions with finality,” but can 
only “hear dispositive motions, . . . [and] present recommend[ed] findings and 
conclusions for decision by a District Judge.” Id. at 46–47. 
 132. Beeler, supra note 130, at 57. 
 133. Villazor, supra note 85, at 255 (citing a Federal Judicial Center tabula-
tion from March 2013). 
 134. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, 
J., dissenting) (“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a 
single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try 
novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”). 
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Drug courts “emerged to address addiction and its correla-
tion to criminal activity.”135 Addicts often “commit crimes to fi-
nance their addiction” or “while under the influence of a sub-
stance,” making “high rates of recidivism the norm.”136 The 
model pioneered in Dade County intervenes before incarceration, 
avoiding both the high costs of incarceration and the collateral 
consequences that follow conviction. This ex-ante approach rec-
ognizes that addiction is a disease, rather than the kind of anti-
social behavior for which incarceration is the best response.137 
As the drug court model proved effective at combating this par-
ticularly pernicious form of recidivism, states continued to invest 
in these kinds of programs and provided their judicial system the 
authority and flexibility necessary to support their development. 
The development of federal reentry programs is, in contrast, 
a judge-driven process.138 Districts forming reentry courts have, 
almost universally, drawn upon the experience of the programs 
that came before.139 The majority of programs focus on proba-
tioners with substance abuse issues, but there is wide variation 
regarding eligibility.140 There is also significant variation in the 
risk level of participants.141 All but two programs use the Risk 
Prediction Index (RPI),142 a risk-assessment tool used in federal 
 
 135. Fisher, supra note 31, at 750. 
 136. Id. at 753. 
 137. Critics of the disease theory of addiction suggest it “has its roots in 
eighteenth century liberal metaphysics, not in science.” Morris B. Hoffman, The 
Drug Court Scandal, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1437, 1469 (2000). However, both the 
American Society of Addiction Medicine and the American Psychiatric Associa-
tion now describe addiction as a brain disease. Fisher, supra note 31, at 750–
51. 
 138. Barbara Meierhoefer, Judge-Involved Supervision Programs in the Fed-
eral Courts: Summary of Findings from the Survey of Chief United States Pro-
bation Officers, FED. PROB., Sept. 2011, at 37 (noting that more than “three-
quarters of the federal judge-involved supervision programs” studied had been 
developed “at the request of the court”). 
 139. Id. (“[T]eam members in all but two courts travelled during the plan-
ning stage to observe at least one other district’s program in action.”). 
 140. Id. at 38. Of the thirty-nine programs studied by Meierhoefer, thirty-
four are “open only to offenders with a particular type of problem.” Id. Of those, 
twenty-three are targeted specifically to those with a “documented history of 
substance abuse.” Id. Only three reentry programs targeted specific problem 
populations other than substance abuse; one targeted gang members, one tar-
geted prisoners with mental health issues, and one focused on “Native Ameri-
cans who lack coping skills.” Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
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probation since 1997 to “determine the general risk level of of-
fenders received for . . . supervised release . . . .”143 Forty-four 
percent of programs targeted “high-risk” offenders, while 
twenty-five percent targeted only “moderate-risk” offenders.144 
Regardless of the risk level of the population, there is one unify-
ing trait: all participants have just been released from prison. 
This is one of the fundamental challenges facing federal reentry 
programs. They are essentially ex-ante interventions applied to 
the ex-post context; the twin benefits of drug courts—avoiding 
both the high cost of incarceration and the collateral conse-
quences of conviction—are abrogated when incarceration is a 
necessary antecedent to program participation. 
That is not to say reentry courts fail to provide independent 
benefits in their own right—but it is not yet definitively known 
what those benefits are. Despite operating for more than a dec-
ade, no longitudinal studies of the impact of federal reentry court 
participation on offender outcomes exist.145 Where individual 
federal reentry courts have undergone evaluations, they have 
not been designed as long-term outcome studies.146 That’s be-
cause “concrete data remains undeveloped because districts are 
still experimenting, and no reentry courts have identical pro-
grams, focuses, or eligibility requirements.”147 In fact, according 
to a study conducted by the Federal Judicial Center (FJC), “no 
two [federal reentry] programs are identical.”148 The FJC found 
“a wide range of goals, philosophies, and design features” in the 
 
 143. Id. at 38 n.8. 
 144. Id. at 38. 
 145. See, e.g., Beeler, supra note 130, at 58 (noting that there is “little long-
term empirical research” on reentry court effectiveness); Meierhoefer, supra 
note 138, at 46 (acknowledging the need to “examine the relationship between 
supervision outcomes . . . and information . . . about . . . program design fea-
tures”); Vance, supra note 80, at 65 (noting that there is “limited research on 
whether these programs effectively reduce recidivism”). 
 146. See CAITLIN J. TAYLOR, PROGRAM EVALUATION OF THE FEDERAL 
REENTRY COURT IN THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA: REPORT ON THE 
EFFECTIVENESS FOR THE FIRST 164 REENTRY COURT PARTICIPANTS 14 (2014), 
http://digitalcommons.lasalle.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context= 
soc_crj_faculty (observing the need to “consider the possibility that the Reentry 
Court program may influence recidivism . . . in a time period not sufficiently 
captured by this study”); see also CLOSE ET AL., supra note 127 (discussing the 
District of Oregon’s reentry court and replication strategies); Patricia A. Sulli-
van et al., H.O.P.E. Court, Rhode Island’s Federal Reentry Court: The First Year, 
21 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 521 (2016) (examining some of the challenges 
and lessons learned from the first year of the H.O.P.E. Court’s existence). 
 147. Villazor, supra note 85, at 255 (citation omitted). 
 148. Meierhoefer, supra note 138, at 38. 
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thirty-nine reentry courts included in the study, noting that “a 
better understanding of how various program features . . . re-
late[] to program success” would be necessary in order to evalu-
ate their effectiveness.149 
This difficulty is, in part, a by-product of the use of state 
drug courts as models.150 They are appealing because their abil-
ity to achieve the goals151 of federal reentry courts is extensively 
studied and well-established.152 But these federal ex-post pro-
grams are applying the model to a post-incarceration population, 
without the benefit of the mountains of data produced by drug 
courts over nearly three decades.153 As another FJC study noted, 
“focus[ing] on adhering to a . . . program model developed else-
where can detract from the harder tasks of . . . identifying the 
core elements of other programs that have had success address-
ing the same problems, and adapting these elements to meet the 
new program’s purposes . . . .”154 
State courts combatted this challenge during the infancy of 
drug courts. As interest began to grow, representatives from the 
first twelve programs came together in 1994 to form NADCP.155 
The NADCP drafted “model state legislation and provided early 
guidance to state legislatures,” to facilitate the creation of drug 
courts across the nation.156 It also created a blue-ribbon commis-
sion to formulate core principles to serve as a blueprint for the 
 
 149. Id. at 46. 
 150. See Fisher, supra note 31, at 755. 
 151. See SIFTON & WEINSTEIN, supra note 125, at 3 (laying out three goals 
for the STAR program: (1) rehabilitating offenders “whose criminal violations 
are tied to drug addiction” and decreasing recidivism for those offenders; (2) 
increasing public safety by “reducing the number of crimes committed by those 
addicted”; and (3) reducing expenditures made for supervision). 
 152. See, e.g., Fisher, supra note 31, at 754 (citation omitted) (“The prolifer-
ation of drug courts . . . is due in large part to reduced recidivism rates and net 
costs to the government . . . .”). But see Hoffman, supra note 137, at 1533 (“Drug 
courts themselves have become a kind of institutional narcotic upon which the 
entire criminal justice system is becoming increasingly dependent.”); see also 
Belenko, supra note 43, at 33–37 (outlining six areas requiring additional study 
to best evaluate drug courts). 
 153. See, e.g., NDCI REPORT, supra note 18. 
 154. BARBARA S. MEIERHOEFER & PATRICIA D. BREEN, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., 
PROCESS-DESCRIPTIVE STUDY OF JUDGE-INVOLVED SUPERVISION PROGRAMS IN 
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 30 (2013), https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2014/ 
JUDGE-INVOLVED-SUPERVISION-FJC-2013.pdf. 
 155. About NADCP, NAT’L ASS’N DRUG COURT PROF ’LS, http://www.nadcp 
.org/learn/about-nadcp (last visited Jan. 30, 2018). 
 156. Id. (quoted material is accessible by selecting “NADCP Early Victo-
ries”). 
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creation of additional drug courts.157 In 1997, the commission re-
leased “the defining document of the [d]rug [c]ourt model,”158 
which has served as the foundation for every adult drug court 
created since its publication.159 That same year, “in response to 
a great need for standardized, evidence-based training and tech-
nical assistance,” the NADCP also created the National Drug 
Court Institute (NDCI), which is now recognized as the “defini-
tive authority on the latest research, best practices, and cutting-
edge innovations to treat offenders facing substance use and 
mental health disorders.”160 
Given the distance between the goals of federal ex-post pro-
grams and the successes of the state ex-ante interventions, it is 
necessary for the federal judiciary to (1) consider the adoption of 
its own ex-ante regime; and (2) further advance its ex-post pro-
grams, as well as invest in better institutionalizing and support-
ing of those programs through study and best-practice develop-
ment. 
III.  A NEW PATH FOR FEDERAL PROBLEM-SOLVING 
COURTS   
A. CREATE EX-ANTE FEDERAL PROGRAMS 
The failure of Congress to create a system of diversionary 
programs—that is, to learn from the states and create a federal 
 
 157. Id. (cited material is accessible by selecting “NADCP Early Victories”). 
 158. Id. (quoted material is accessible by selecting “NADCP Early Victo-
ries”). The document detailed ten key components: (1) drug courts integrate al-
cohol and other drug treatment services with justice system case processing; (2) 
using a non-adversarial approach, prosecution and defense counsel promote 
public safety while protecting participants’ due process rights; (3) eligible par-
ticipants are identified early and promptly placed in the drug court program; 
(4) drug courts provide access to a continuum of alcohol, drug, and other related 
treatment and rehabilitation services; (5) abstinence is monitored by frequent 
alcohol and other drug testing; (6) a coordinated strategy governs drug court 
responses to participants’ compliance; (7) ongoing judicial interaction with each 
drug court participant is essential; (8) monitoring and evaluation measure the 
achievement of program goals and gauge effectiveness; (9) continuing interdis-
ciplinary education promotes effective drug court planning, implementation, 
and operations; and (10) forging partnerships among drug courts, public agen-
cies, and community-based organizations generates local support and enhances 
drug court effectiveness. DRUG COURT STANDARDS COMM., THE NAT’L ASS’N OF 
DRUG COURT PROF ’LS, DEFINING DRUG COURTS: THE KEY COMPONENTS, at iii–
iv (1997), http://www.nadcp.org/sites/default/files/nadcp/KeyComponents.pdf. 
 159. See NAT’L ASS’N DRUG COURT PROF ’LS, supra note 155 (cited material 
is accessible by selecting “NADCP Early Victories”). 
 160. About NDCI, NAT’L DRUG COURT INST., http://www.ndci.org/about-ndci 
(last visited Jan. 30, 2018). 
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drug court—led to the creation of the federal reentry court sys-
tem. Unable to follow the experience of the states and adequately 
address addiction-driven recidivism in an ex-ante context, fed-
eral judges turned to an ex-post solution—a context in which 
they already possessed ample authority. Congress could address 
this problem by following Judge Lay’s 2004 request and pass 
comprehensive legislation authorizing federal judges, the U.S. 
Office of Probation and Pretrial Services, federal defenders, and 
U.S. attorneys to implement federal drug courts. Unfortunately, 
Congressional silence on this issue for nearly two decades sig-
nals that such action is unlikely. The 115th Congress began with 
discussions of bipartisan criminal justice reform legislation to 
“reduce mandatory minimum sentences, give judges more dis-
cretion to suit the punishment to the offense, invest more in al-
ternatives such as drug and mental health treatment, and en-
courage programs that prepare the incarcerated for life after 
prison,” but the bill died in 2016.161 Although Senate Judiciary 
Chair Chuck Grassley met with President Trump’s son-in-law 
and senior adviser Jared Kushner162 to discuss potentially reviv-
ing the bill, Attorney General Jeff Sessions was a strong oppo-
nent of the legislation when he was a senator, and the President 
himself has not signaled any interest in the issue.163 
In the face of this inaction, Article III judges must take mat-
ters in hand themselves, and create a federal ex-ante regime. 
They may do so under (1) statutory authority granted as part of 
the pretrial services statute; (2) statutory authority granted via 
the Rules Enabling Act; or (3) their inherent rulemaking powers. 
Federal authorities should, at the same time, further refine ex-
post interventions like reentry courts by (1) institutionalizing 
reentry processes via the Federal Sentencing Guidelines; and (2) 
investing in research programs to determine best practices and 
create model ex-post programs. 
 
 161. Bill Keller, Editorial, 2017: The Year for Justice Reform?, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 16, 2016, at A35. 
 162. Glenn Thrush & Maggie Haberman, Jared Kushner Named Senior 
White House Adviser to Donald Trump, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 9, 2017), https://www 
.nytimes.com/2017/01/09/us/jared-kushner-senior-adviser-white-house-trump 
.html. 
 163. Mary Clare Jalonick, White House Adviser Kushner, Senator Talk Crim-
inal Justice, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Mar. 30, 2017), https://www.apnews.com/ 
92a2535b853d4de9a62007eb5685c13c. 
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1. Statutory Authority for Article III Judges to Create Federal 
Drug Courts at the District Court Level 
While there has not been explicit congressional authoriza-
tion of federal drug courts, Article III judges have sufficient stat-
utory powers to create such programs. After creating the nation’s 
first federal reentry program, STAR,164 the judges of the Eastern 
District of New York “concluded that if the drug court model pro-
duces benefits in the reentry context, it has the potential to pro-
duce far greater benefits if it is moved up into the presentence 
phase.”165 In 2012, judges in EDNY launched the Pretrial Op-
portunity Program (POP).166 While the POP program is not ex-
plicitly a diversion program—“most participants have entered 
pleas of guilty by the time they enter the program,” though “a 
guilty plea is not a prerequisite to participation”167—the “pro-
gram description explicitly contemplates the possibility that the 
rehabilitation of the participating defendant might be suffi-
ciently extraordinary that outright dismissal of the charges on 
the motion of the United States Attorney would be appropri-
ate.”168 The court has granted three such dismissals, and re-
duced felony charges to misdemeanors in two other cases.169 
POP cites 18 U.S.C. § 3154, the statute outlining the func-
tions and powers relating to pretrial services, as the legal au-
thority for such programs.170 While this authority may seem may 
seem murky, recall that the basis for federal reentry courts is 
the supervised release statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3583.171 Both describe 
the outlines of pretrial services and supervised release regimes 
in broad terms, and both commit the regimes to the broad dis-
cretion of district courts. If § 3583 can contain problem-solving-
justice multitudes, so too can § 3154. 
 
 164. See supra note 127 and accompanying text. 
 165. EDNY ALTERNATIVES REPORT, supra note 123, at 8. 
 166. Id. at 4. 
 167. Id. at 9 (emphasis added). 
 168. Id. at 10. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. at 63 (“Section 3154 of Title 18, United States Code, gives pretrial 
services officers the authority to provide for the custody, care, counseling, treat-
ment or other necessary social services to defendants released under pretrial 
supervision. The objective of support services for defendants on pretrial release 
is to ensure the safety of the community and to provide defendants with the 
structure and stability necessary to reasonably assure their appearance in court 
as required. Treatment and other support services provide the judge with alter-
natives to pre-sentence detention for those defendants who require close super-
vision and behavior monitoring.”). 
 171. Supra notes 107–27 and accompanying text. 
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District courts—particularly those with long experience 
with reentry courts172—should follow the example of POP, but 
take it a step further and create a true diversionary program. 
Districts should look to NADCP for drug court best practices and 
defining characteristics,173 and design ex-ante diversionary pro-
grams that best address the drug-crime issues facing their 
courts; NDCI should be invited to study the programs from their 
inception, and help to facilitate building data-driven programs 
best suited for adapting the ex-ante approach to the federal con-
text. Just as most reentry courts are currently funded via alloca-
tion of existing judicial resources, these drug courts could be set 
up without additional funding; outside funding streams may also 
be available, given the interest of the nonprofit sector in criminal 
justice reform issues. 
2. Statutory Authority for Article III Judges to Create a 
Nationwide Federal Drug Court Regime 
While § 3154 would appear to allow district courts to create 
diversionary programs on an ad hoc basis—as was the case with 
the development of reentry programs—the whole of the Article 
III judiciary is also sufficiently empowered to create a nation-
wide federal drug court regime, via the Rules Enabling Act.174 
Passed in 1934, the Rules Enabling Act created a process for fed-
eral courts to “prescribe rules for the conduct of their busi-
ness”175 via the Judicial Conference of the United States, the pol-
icy making body of the federal court system.176 The Judicial 
 
 172. Given the buy-in from U.S. attorneys and federal defenders necessary 
to run such a diversionary program, it seems wise to look to district courts where 
these relationships have already been forged via reentry courts. 
 173. Supra note 158 and accompanying text. 
 174. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071–2077 (2012) (§ 2076 repealed 1988). 
 175. Id. § 2071(a). The choice of phrase “created a process,” rather than “al-
lowed” is a deliberate one. It has long been argued that courts have inherent 
power to create rules of practice and procedure for themselves. See, e.g., Charles 
W. Joiner & Oscar J. Miller, Rules of Practice and Procedure: A Study of Judi-
cial Rule Making, 55 MICH. L. REV. 623, 624 (1957) (surveying and discussing 
“the sources and scope of the [judicial] rule-making power”); Roscoe Pound, Pro-
cedure Under Rules of Court in New Jersey, 66 HARV. L. REV. 28 (1952); Roscoe 
Pound, Regulating Procedural Details by Rules of Court, 13 A.B.A. J. 12, 13 
(1927) (arguing for a restoration of “the rule-making power of the courts, a 
power which all common-law courts possessed and exercised when our consti-
tutions were adopted”). 
 176. See 28 U.S.C. § 331 (2012) (“The Chief Justice of the United States shall 
summon annually the chief judge of each judicial circuit, the chief judge of the 
Court of International Trade, and a district judge from each judicial circuit to a 
conference at such time and place in the United States as he may designate. He 
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Conference’s Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Pro-
cedure, aided by five subject-matter advisory committees,177 
evaluates operation of the federal rules and considers amend-
ments via a public process strongly resembling notice-and-com-
ment rulemaking in the administrative law context.178 The 
Standing Committee may then recommend new or amended 
rules to the Judicial Conference, who may then pass them on to 
the Supreme Court.179 If the Court agrees to the proposal, it for-
wards them on, by May 1 of a given year, to Congress, which 
then has until December 1 to override the proposal by passing a 
law disapproving the proposed Rule.180 Thus, Congress and the 
President may overrule a proposed or amended rule—but only 
via the normal legislative process of bicameralism and present-
ment.181 
The Judicial Conference should convene a select advisory 
committee to study state ex-ante drug court programs, and make 
recommendations for the creation of a small number of model ex-
ante programs. As was suggested above in Part III.A.1, this se-
lect committee should pay particularly close attention to the 
work of the NADCP blue-ribbon commission and design pro-
grams based on their best practices, and should invite those dis-
tricts with long experience in problem-solving justice to discuss 
their experiences with ex-post programs to better inform the de-
velopment of model federal drug court programs. These models 
should then go through the rules vetting process, to ensure sup-
port from the Judicial Conference and the Supreme Court. While 
Congress has long slumbered on providing unambiguous author-
ization for federal ex-ante programs, the Rules Enabling Act pro-
 
shall preside at such conference which shall be known as the Judicial Confer-
ence of the United States. Special sessions of the Conference may be called by 
the Chief Justice at such times and places as he may designate.”); see also Gov-
ernance and the Judicial Conference, U.S. COURTS, www.uscourts.gov/ 
about-federal-courts/governance-judicial-conference (last visited Jan. 30, 2018). 
 177. The five rule subject-matter areas are: appellate, bankruptcy, civil, 
criminal, and evidence. How the Rulemaking Process Works, U.S. COURTS, 
www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/about-rulemaking-process/how 
-rulemaking-process-works (last visited Jan. 30, 2018). 
 178. See id. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2074 (2012) (“The Supreme Court shall trans-
mit to the Congress not later than May 1 of the year in which a rule prescribed 
under section 2072 is to become effective a copy of the proposed rule. Such rule 
shall take effect no earlier than December 1 of the year in which such rule is so 
transmitted unless otherwise provided by law.”). 
 181. See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
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vides an opportunity to force the issue. Congress and the Presi-
dent would have to explicitly reject providing federal courts the 
opportunity to avail themselves of drug courts, and given the ap-
parent inability of legislative leaders in Washington to achieve 
the policy goals of the current majority,182 such action seems un-
likely. 
The Rules Enabling Act requires that federal practice and 
procedure rules “shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any sub-
stantive right.”183 While some would argue diversionary pro-
grams like drug courts run afoul of this prohibition, similar pro-
grams at the state level have been found to be procedural rather 
than substantive. New Jersey, for example, created a program 
called pretrial intervention (PTI).184 The program was created 
under the auspices of a state court rule, and the New Jersey Su-
preme Court found that “PTI [is] ‘a procedural alternative to the 
traditional system of prosecuting and incarcerating criminal 
suspects,’ and thus within the practice and procedure over which 
our rule-making power extends.”185 This, the court said, was be-
cause “pretrial intervention provides one means of addressing 
the problems of congestion and backlog of cases which currently 
confront our prosecutors, public defenders, and courts. . . . [i]t 
also permits a more efficient use of the limited resources availa-
ble to law enforcement authorities.”186 The New Jersey Supreme 
Court went on to find no separation of powers violation in the 
creation of such a program via judicial rule, since the program 
was procedural rather than substantive.187 It cited Justice Jack-
son’s concurrence from the Steel Seizure case—“[w]here [sic] the 
Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it also 
 
 182. See, e.g., Thomas Kaplan & Robert Pear, Senate Republicans Say They 
Will Note Vote on Health Bill, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 26, 2017), https://www 
.nytimes.com/2017/09/26/us/politics/mcconnell-obamacare-repeal-graham 
-cassidy-trump.html.  
 183. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2012). 
 184. The Garden State’s PTI program was created in the 1970s, as a sort of 
proto-drug court. See State v. Leonardis, 363 A.2d 321, 321–32 (1976) (describ-
ing the motivation for and process of creating the PTI program in New Jersey) 
[hereinafter Leonardis I]. It was one of several early diversionary programs, 
experimentation with which eventually lead to the creation of problem-solving 
courts. For a discussion of these early PTI-type programs, see Note, Criminal 
Practice—Pretrial Intervention Programs—An Innovative Reform of the Crimi-
nal Justice System, 28 RUTGERS L. REV. 1203 (1975); Note, Pretrial Diversion 
from the Criminal Process, 83 YALE L.J. 827 (1974). 
 185. State v. Leonardis, 375 A.2d 607, 611 (1977) [hereinafter Leonardis II] 
(quoting Leonardis I, 363 A.2d at 324–25). 
 186. Leonardis I, 363 A.2d at 327. 
 187. Leonardis II, 375 A.2d at 611–14. 
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contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed powers 
into a workable government”188—and the Rules Enabling Act.189 
The federal process suggested by this Note would suffer even less 
from separation of powers concerns, since Congress and the 
President would have the opportunity to override the rule, which 
was not the case with PTI.190 
3. Inherent Authority for Article III Judges to Create Federal 
Drug Courts 
For those seeking authority to create federal drug courts, 
the authority conferred by § 3154 may appear insufficient, and 
the Rules Enabling Act process may seem too lengthy and polit-
ical a route to travel. In that case, Article III judges can (and 
should) use their inherent powers to create ex-ante programs. As 
recently as 2016, the Supreme Court acknowledged that “district 
court[s] possess[] inherent powers that are ‘governed not by rule 
or statute but by the control necessarily vested in courts to man-
age their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious 
disposition of cases.’”191 While limited in some respects—they (1) 
“must be a ‘reasonable response to the problems and needs’ con-
fronting the court’s fair administration of justice;”192 and (2) 
“cannot be contrary to any express grant of or limitation on the 
district court’s power contained in a rule or statute”193—inherent 
powers exist broadly to allow district courts to “manage their 
dockets and courtrooms with a view toward the efficient and ex-
pedient resolution of cases.”194 
Rulemaking, including the creation of procedural alterna-
tives to trial such as drug courts, has long been viewed as part 
 
 188. Id. at 613 (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 
579, 635 (Jackson, J., concurring)). 
 189. Id. at 613–14. 
 190. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring) (noting that 
“congressional inertia, indifference or quiescence may sometimes, at least as a 
practical matter, enable, if not invite, measures on independent . . . responsibil-
ity”). 
 191. Dietz v. Bouldin, 136 S. Ct. 1885, 1891 (2016) (quoting Link v. Wa-
bash R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630–31 (1962)). 
 192. Id. at 1892 (quoting Degen v. United States, 517 U.S. 820, 823–24 
(1996)). 
 193. Id. (citing Degen, 517 U.S. at 823). 
 194. Id. (citing four Supreme Court cases that each upheld a district court’s 
use of its inherent powers). 
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of courts’ inherent power.195 The New Jersey Supreme Court 
noted, in upholding PTI, that although the Garden State’s Con-
stitution explicitly granted it rulemaking authority,196 such 
power “has also been widely recognized as falling within courts’ 
inherent powers.”197 While the federal Constitution does not in-
clude such an express grant of authority in Article III, cases such 
as Dietz indicate that the vesting of “the judicial [p]ower” in the 
Supreme Court and “in such inferior [c]ourts as the Congress 
may . . . establish” includes the inherent power to create local 
rules to govern their affairs.198 The absence of any bar, in rule or 
statute, to the creation of ex-ante programs in the federal system 
is sufficient to allow Article III judges to create such programs 
as a means of controlling their own dockets. Whether under stat-
utory or inherent authority, Article III judges must respond to 
the ongoing substance-abuse crisis confronting the justice sys-
tem by profiting from the example of successful ex-ante interven-
tions in the states, and create a federal drug court regime. 
4. Institutional Buy-In from Other Justice System Actors 
Success of such judicially created ex-ante programs will re-
quire buy-in from the Justice Department and U.S. attorneys, as 
well as federal defenders. While DOJ “initially argued against 
adoption of federal drug courts” in 2006, it “specifically encour-
aged its prosecutors to actively participate in reentry courts” in 
2011.199 Many U.S. attorneys have chosen to join these ex-post 
programs; the 2011 FJC study found assistant U.S. attorneys 
 
 195. See, e.g., Joiner & Miller, supra note 175, at 630 (“A shorthand state-
ment might be that the courts may provide for the ‘how’ in the courts; the legis-
lators, the ‘what.’ Thus when the purpose of the rule is to provide for the estab-
lishment and maintenance of the machinery essential for the efficient 
administration of judicial business, and it does only that, the scope of the inher-
ent power vested in the courts is complete and supreme.”). 
 196. “The Supreme Court shall make rules governing the administration of 
all courts in the State and, subject to the law, the practice and procedure in all 
such courts.” N.J. CONST., art. VI, § 2, para. 3 (1947). 
 197. Leonardis II, 375 A.2d 607, 611 (1977) (citations omitted). 
 198. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. While Article III contains no analogue to the 
Necessary and Proper Clause found in Article I, it is settled law of nearly two 
centuries that where power is granted in the constitution, there must be a 
means of carrying out that power. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 323–
24 (1819) (“Even without the aid of the general clause in the constitution, em-
powering congress to pass all necessary and proper laws for carrying its powers 
into execution, the grant of powers itself necessarily implies the grant of all 
usual and suitable means for the execution of the powers granted.”). 
 199. Matthew G. Rowland, Assessing the Case for Formal Recognition and 
Expansion of Federal Problem-Solving Courts, FED. PROB., Dec. 2016, at 3, 7. 
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were “full team partners playing [a] key role” in twenty-four of 
the thirty-nine reentry programs studied.200 This partnership is 
even more critical in the ex-ante context, since U.S. attorneys 
must agree to forgo prosecution in the event that offenders com-
plete the diversionary program.201 The EDNY notes, for exam-
ple, that before becoming Attorney General of the United States, 
then-U.S. Attorney Loretta Lynch provided initial support for 
POP.202 The transition from the Obama to Trump Administra-
tion and Attorney General Sessions’s initial tough-on-crime ac-
tions203—particularly as they relate to drug crime204—at least 
create doubts about the future of federal participation in ex-ante 
efforts. However, weighing that possibility against the long-term 
benefit for federal problem-solving justice, such doubts should 
not per se stall taking this critical next step. Prosecutor cooper-
ation should be judged after the creation of the programs, for, as 
was said to Ray Kinsella, “[i]f you build it, [they] will come.”205 
B. FURTHER DEVELOP EX-POST FEDERAL PROGRAMS 
While this Note argues that the federal system currently 
over relies on ex-post programs, it does not imply that it should 
stop investing in reentry courts altogether. The courts should in-
stitute an ex-ante diversionary program while, at the same time, 
further developing existing ex-post programs by: (1) instituting 
them through the Sentencing Guidelines; and (2) instituting a 
centralized research and data collection project through USSC. 
In the event political realities make that impossible, the FJC 
 
 200. Meierhoefer, supra note 138, at 43. 
 201. The New Jersey Supreme Court found in Leonardis I that arbitrary 
prosecutorial discretion violated the rehabilitative aims of PTI, and ordered 
that (1) “Defendants who have been accused of Any [sic] crime shall be eligible 
for admission to” PTI; and (2) “Defendant[s] admission . . . should be measured 
according to [their] amenability to correction, responsiveness to rehabilitation 
and nature of the offense with which [they are] charged.” Leonardis I, 363 A.2d 
321, 340 (1976) (emphasis added). Federal courts are, however, unlikely to so 
circumscribe the prosecutorial discretion of U.S. attorneys. 
 202. EDNY ALTERNATIVES REPORT, supra note 123, at 9. 
 203. See, e.g., Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Eric Lichtblau, Justice Dept. to Re-Ex-
amine Police Accords, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2017, at A1. 
 204. See, e.g., Remarks by Attorney General Sessions to Law Enforcement 
About the Opioid Epidemic, DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Sept. 22, 2017), https://www 
.justice.gov/opa/speech/remarks-attorney-general-sessions-law-enforcement 
-about-opioid-epidemic. 
 205. FIELD OF DREAMS (Universal Pictures 1989). The quote is often errone-
ously rendered as quoted above; the correct quote is “[i]f you build it, he will 
come,” referring, specifically, to the spirit of Kinsella’s father. 
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could play a similar institutional role—though without the stat-
utorily prescribed role in the sentencing process. 
When Jeremy Travis first proposed reentry courts, he fore-
saw sentencing judges playing the reentry role, and managing 
the process before, during, and after incarceration.206 To make 
this possible, the USSC should promulgate sentencing guide-
lines specifically geared towards reentry. This would fit squarely 
in its statutory mission to “[r]eflect, to the extent practicable, ad-
vancement in knowledge of human behavior as it relates to the 
criminal justice process” and to “develop means of measuring the 
degree to which the sentencing, penal, and correctional practices 
are effective in meeting the purposes of sentencing.”207 USSC 
reentry guidelines would provide the guidance, centralization, 
and incentives to create and evaluate a system that could be de-
ployed across the whole of the federal criminal justice system. 
This would also truly be a reentry court—a process geared from 
the beginning towards an offender’s eventual return home, re-
gardless of the nature of their offense—rather than the drug-
court-by-another-name-and-at-another-time that make up most 
federal reentry courts today. 
The FJC could also serve as the venue for such a program. 
Serving as the “research and education agency of the [federal ju-
dicial system],”208 the FJC was created by Congress in 1967.209 
The FJC has already undertaken some limited studies of reentry 
programs, and in each case called for further research.210 Addi-
tionally, the FJC in 2016 released the results of an experimental 
treatment of five reentry programs designed by the FJC and as-
signed randomly to five districts without reentry courts of their 
own.211 This report called into question the validity of the 
reentry project.212 It found that “participants in judge-led 
[reentry] court programs had higher revocation and rearrest 
rates than those subject to traditional supervision by probation 
 
 206. See Travis, supra note 66, at 2. 
 207. 28 U.S.C. §§ 991(b)(1)(C), (b)(2) (2012). 
 208. About the Federal Judicial Center, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., https://www.fjc 
.gov/about (last visited Jan. 30, 2018). 
 209. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 620–629 (2012).  
 210. See MEIERHOEFER & BREEN, supra note 154, at vii–viii; Meierhoefer, 
supra note 138, at 46. 
 211. See Letter from Hon. Ann Aiken, Dist. Court Judge, U.S. Dist. Court for 
the Dist. of Or., to Hon. Jeremy Fogel, Dir., Fed. Judicial Ctr. (Oct. 27, 2016) 
(on file with author) (citing FED. JUDICIAL CTR., FJC EVALUATION OF A FEDERAL 
REENTRY PROGRAM MODEL (2016)). 
 212. Id. 
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officers.”213 The results, however, were “not deemed statistically 
significant due to the number of program participants in-
volved.”214 The study’s design was also severely criticized by both 
reentry court judges215 and addiction research professionals.216 
Given these challenges, the FJC would need to rebuild trust with 
the federal reentry community and provide support to a collabo-
rative process, rather than undertaking a research program out-
side of existing reentry courts. But, its research expertise and 
strong connection to the federal judiciary would make it a strong 
potential institutional research and development partner. In ei-
ther case, further refinement of data-driven ex-post programs 
must be the next step in the development of federal reentry ef-
forts. 
  CONCLUSION   
Drug courts are among the few proven tools to reduce addic-
tion-based recidivism. There is some debate on the magnitude of 
their success, yet the data tell a clear story of re-arrest reduction 
for both program graduates, and even those who participate 
without completion. Federal reentry programs have value as 
well, particularly when it comes to managing and minimizing 
the impact of collateral consequences on offenders. Striking the 
proper balance between an ex-ante and ex-post approach for fed-
eral courts may be difficult, but it would still be an improvement 
over the current all-or-nothing approach. Such a rebalancing is 
necessary for our country, through the federal courts, to take 
steps toward addressing addiction as a disease, rather than as a 
crime. 
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